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
25 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/DCI/IC
FROM : Cord Meyer, Jr., SA/DDCI
SUBJECT : Intelligence Support to Crisis Management

1. Following our meeting with the DDCI on 16 November, we sought the informal views of the other principal agencies of the Intelligence Community concerned with intelligence support during crisis -- DIA, NSA, and State/INR -- on the proposals in our 12 October paper. The response has been generally favorable. While the other agencies have certain reservations in detail, they agree that the DCI could exercise a greater degree of Community leadership during periods of crisis and that the concept of a crisis coordinator of intelligence activities and a Community crisis checklist are sound. The specific written comments of DIA, NSA, and State/INR are at Tab A.

2. We have incorporated these comments in a revision of the 12 October memorandum. A draft of this revision, in the form of a memorandum from the D/DCI/IC to the DCI, is at Tab B. In this draft we have tried to accommodate most of the concerns of DIA, NSA, and State/INR and have described the functions of the Coordinator (retitled DCI Crisis Advisor) in greater detail. We have stated the various alternative organizational options for the advisor role and have added another option -- Chairman of a new DCI Committee -- which was not in the earlier proposal.

3. Since crisis liaison relations between the DCI and the Secretaries of Defense and State may well be part of the larger issue of relations between new officials in all three positions, I believe the DCI should consider the liaison



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proposals separately from the establishment of the Advisor and the Checklist; the latter two being matters which can be dealt with within the Intelligence Community itself.

4. I propose that we meet to discuss these proposals when you have had an opportunity to review them.

[Redacted]
Cord Meyer, Jr.

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Attachments: As stated

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SA/DDCI/CMeyer, [Redacted]

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

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1 - [Redacted] IG Staff
1 - [Redacted] IC Staff
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25 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : [REDACTED] 25X
D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT : Intelligence Support to Crisis Management

1. In accordance with your 16 August instructions, we have reviewed the Intelligence Community's procedures for national intelligence support in crisis situations. We have concluded that the existing formal mechanisms (NIO coordination, the Strategic Warning Staff, Alert Memorandum, CRITIC reporting, the National Intelligence Situation Report, NOIWON conferencing and the Time-Critical Requirements procedures of the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees) are basically sound and should be continued. While my staff is continuing to study ways in which the Intelligence Community can improve its future ability to provide warning intelligence and intelligence support during crises, we have found that there are some specific measures that could be taken now that would improve your ability to lead the Intelligence Community during crises and would assist you in providing more effective support to U.S. foreign policy and military responses during periods of crisis. Briefly these measures are:

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a. the institution of a Checklist of Intelligence Community Actions during Crises.

b. the establishment of the position of DCI Crisis Advisor.

c. the designation of formal DCI liaison representatives to State and Defense crisis planning groups.

2. In reviewing Community actions in recent minor crises, we noted the essentially ad hoc and piecemeal nature of decisions on how to organize intelligence resources to cope with each crisis. As has been noted in various post-mortems, the delays and confusion that this causes detracts from quick and effective marshalling of our collection and analytic resources. Without inhibiting flexibility we believe that a more deliberate approach to considering actions to be taken during crises could reduce unnecessary delay and confusion. To this end, we have drafted the attached Checklist of Intelligence Community Actions During Crises. This Checklist identifies specific actions to be considered in any crisis situation and assigns responsibility for them. The actions described would not be mandatory, but would be those that should be considered in each crisis situation. The actions are listed in nominal order, but it is recognized that events may place certain of these actions in a different

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sequence. CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR have informally indicated that the concept of having such a checklist is sound and should be adopted. The present draft describes Community-level and internal CIA procedures and responsibilities. The other agencies have not added their comparable internal procedures to it. You may wish to have this done and further refinements made under NFIB auspices. Further, the Checklist assumes adoption of certain of the other proposals in this memorandum.

3. There is general agreement that there is a need for a DCI Crisis Advisor who would keep the DCI and the NIO fully informed on Community activities and capabilities during a crisis; who would work with the NIO, the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force, and Intelligence Community components to insure that the Community's efforts are quickly focused on key intelligence needs and on intelligence support to U.S. actions during a crisis; and who would serve as the National Intelligence interface with the Pentagon's Collection Coordination Facility. This Advisor would support and complement the NIO in his task of organizing the Community's substantive intelligence efforts by ensuring that the entire Community is efficiently and effectively working together in providing intelligence support during a crisis. This advisor would be knowledgeable

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of Community organization, capabilities, and procedures as they relate to warning and crisis operations and would free the NIO and the Chief of the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force from worries about collection assets during a crisis and would allow them more time for analysis and substantive intelligence coordination.

4. We are persuaded that the position of a DCI Crisis Advisor is a full-time one. He could only carry out his duties during a crisis if, by virtue of his normal responsibilities, he had carefully studied our intelligence capabilities, organizations, and procedures and had established the necessary relationships and understandings with Community components during non-crisis periods. His non-crisis period duties might include:

a. Keeping the Checklist of Intelligence Community Actions During Crises current.

b. Maintaining an up-to-date knowledge of the structure and functioning of the Intelligence Community (and related parts of the national security structure).

c. Develop and coordinate Community contingency planning for anticipated crisis situations.

d. Develop improved Community procedures for handling warning and crisis intelligence.

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e. Coordinate intelligence support to State and Defense contingency planning.

f. Occasionally conduct small-scale exercises, based on selected crisis scenarios, to test improvements in our procedures or to correct noted deficiencies.

5. We are less certain what organizational niche the DCI Crisis Advisor should occupy. We believe that the following options should be considered and are prepared to discuss the pros and cons of each.

a. A member of the NIO Staff.

b. A member of the IC Staff.

c. An additional duty for the Director of the CIA Operations Center, reporting directly to the DCI in this capacity.

d. A chairman of a DCI committee on warning and crisis operations.

6. A DCI Representative to the State Department Interagency Crisis Task Force (when such a Task Force is established) could coordinate Community actions with the Department, and improve communications between the Department and the Community in conveying State's intelligence needs and providing prompt intelligence tailored to those needs. NIO and DDO representation has been provided to State in recent crises with mixed effect.

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Placing these ad hoc arrangements on a more formal basis may lend more weight to a DCI presence in Departmental crisis groups. We believe that this representative can be selected according to the needs of a specific crisis, but that the Department needs formal notice that such a representative would probably be provided in a crisis to carry out specified tasks.

7. A DCI Representative to JCS crisis planning groups should be designated as an individual who would work with the Joint Staff to improve communications between the JCS and the Intelligence Community, to improve national intelligence support to military planning and operations during a crisis, and to keep the DCI and the Community informed of U.S. military actions so that support can be provided and better analysis of foreign reactions can be made. This has been a weakness in our relations with the Pentagon in several crises and is an area where the Director can take initiatives to improve our relationships. We do not believe this to be a full-time job, but we do hold that this representative must be of high enough rank to allow access to the Joint Chiefs, themselves. We recommend that you designate the Director of DIA as your Representative to the JCS for Intelligence Community support to military planning and operations and hold him responsible for keeping you, the NIO, the Chief of the National Intelligence Situation Report Task Force,

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and the DCI Crisis Advisor fully informed on U.S. military plans and actions so that appropriate Community elements can properly assess foreign reaction to U.S. activities and so that the Community can plan for more effective national intelligence support to U.S. military operations.

8. You may wish to consider these proposals for improved liaison relations during crises with State and Defense separately as part of the larger issue of your relations with the new Secretaries. The establishment of the Crisis Advisor position and the Checklist, however, are matters which can be dealt with within the Intelligence Community itself and, as such, are matters you may wish to place on the NFIB agenda.



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Attachment: Draft Checklist of Intelligence Community Actions During Crises

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